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Abstract
While health reform in Australia has been marked by 
piecemeal, incremental changes, the overall trend to 
increasing Commonwealth involvement has not been 
accidental or driven by power-hungry centralists: it 
has been shaped by broader national and international 
developments including technological change and the 
maturing of our nation and its place internationally, and 
by a widespread desire for a national universal health 
insurance system. In many respects the Australian 
health system performs well, but the emerging 
challenges demand a more integrated, patient-oriented 
system. This is likely to require a further shift towards 
the Commonwealth in terms of financial responsibility, 
as the national insurer. But it also requires close 
cooperation with the States, who could play a firmer role 
in service delivery and in supporting regional planning 
and coordination. The likelihood of sharing overall 
responsibility for the health system also suggests there 
is a need to involve the States more fully in processes for 
setting national policies.
This article draws heavily on a lecture presented at 
the Australian National University in October 2015. It 
includes an overview of Australia’s evolving federal 
arrangements and the context within which the current 
Federalism Review is being conducted. It suggests 
Australia will not return to ‘coordinate federalism’ with 
clearly distinct responsibilities, and that greater priority 
should be given to improving how we manage shared 
responsibilities.
There is a long history of Commonwealth involvement 
in health, and future reform should build on that 
rather than try to reverse direction. While critical of 
the proposals from the Commission of Audit and in the 
2014 Budget, the lecture welcomed the more pragmatic
approaches that seemed to be emerging from the 
Federalism Review discussion papers and contributions 
from some Premiers which could promote more sensible 
measures to improve both the effectiveness and the 
financial sustainability of Australia’s health and health 
insurance system.
The Commonwealth’s new political leadership in 2015 
seemed interested in such measures and in moving 
away from the Abbott Government’s approach. But the 
legacy of that approach severely damaged the Turnbull 
Government in the 2016 federal election as it gave 
traction to Labor’s ‘Mediscare’ campaign. In addition 
to resetting the federalism debate as it affects health, 
the Turnbull Government now needs to articulate the 
principles of Medicare and to clarify the role of the 
private sector, including private health insurance, in 
Australia’s universal health insurance system. Labor also 
needs to address more honestly the role of the private 
sector and develop a more coherent policy itself.
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Background
The future of Australia’s federal system, and in particular 
how it deals with health and health insurance, is an issue 
that would benefit from less ideological debate and more 
informed public discussion and engagement focused on 
health outcomes. Perhaps Australia’s relatively new political 
leadership will be more willing than in the recent past to 
promote such public engagement despite the complexity 
and sensitivity of the issues involved.
Federalism and the subsidiarity principle
The subsidiarity principle emerged in Europe in the middle 
ages as the Catholic Church grappled with managing its 
vast empire. In essence, the principle is that responsibilities 
should be managed at the lowest or most local level where 
the public interests concerned are shared. Higher level 
intervention may only be justified if there are genuine 
interests beyond the local community to be considered. A 
corollary of the principle often mentioned in debates today 
is that each level of government should be responsible 
for the revenues needed to pay for its responsibilities, or 
vertical fiscal balance (VFI), though this corollary comes 
at the expense of preventing horizontal fiscal equity – the 
capacity to redistribute revenue from rich localities to poor 
ones.
The subsidiarity principle has several benefits including 
responsiveness to local conditions and preferences, a check 
on central power and potential efficiency gains as each local
community weighs up the costs and benefits of government.
Federal systems differ from decentralised government in 
that the sub-national governments have sovereignty and 
not just delegated authority. Thus they apply the principle of
subsidiarity in a way that involves much more autonomy 
including the making of laws and the power to negotiate 
with other governments including the national government, 
rather than be ruled or over-ruled by the centre.
There are many forms of federations. Ours was originally 
a ‘coordinate federation’ where responsibilities are 
distinguished and each government is able to exercise 
sovereignty over its areas of responsibility. This was 
done in Australia with minimalist powers given to the 
Commonwealth, the outcome of the negotiations amongst 
the six colonies anxious not to cede too many of their 
powers to the new fledgling national government. The 
States retained almost all of their broad ranging powers 
under their own constitutions, but any law they pass that is 
inconsistent with a Commonwealth law (under the powers 
specified in its Constitution) is invalid. In effect, all the 
other powers remain with the States. Canada’s constitution 
uses the reverse arrangement to achieve the same end: it 
specifies the powers of the provinces leaving the rest to 
the national government. Germany has a rather different 
approach where most policy responsibility lies with the 
national government but most administrative responsibility 
lies with the states (or Bundeslander).
These descriptions, however, greatly simplify the institutional 
arrangements involved including the design of the 
legislature, the structure and authority of the judiciary, the 
administrative arrangements and the inter-governmental 
machinery. The institutional arrangements reflect each 
country’s history, geography and culture. The descriptions 
also fail to reveal the dynamic nature of any federal system 
as it adjusts to changing social, economic and technological 
circumstances.
the Australian federation
Our federation was forged out of the history of separate 
British colonial settlements each operating under delegated 
British authority in a huge country with immense distances
between capitals. Despite the geography, there was and 
remains a remarkable degree of homogeneity amongst 
the non-Indigenous populations of the States. Under the 
Constitution, until 1967, the Indigenous population was 
seen as a matter for the States and the federation was not 
driven by the need to assuage any other different ethnic 
or religious or language groups, or by vast differences in 
income and wealth.
This may help to explain why the Australian Senate, unlike 
the Canadian Senate, never operated as a States house 
but, from the beginning, operated on a party basis. Party 
distinctions have always been seen as more significant than 
state differences.
The steady accretion of power to the Commonwealth 
over the twentieth century may also be explained in part 
by the considerable homogeneity of the population. 
More important, I suspect, has been changing social and 
economic circumstances driven in part by technological 
change. A large part of the shift has come through High 
Court decisions and some federalists, of course, complain 
that excessive judicial adventurism was involved. Yet it is 
important to remember that in every case the Court was 
required to decide on constitutionality in the context of how 
to manage a particular and difficult public policy matter. 
That the answer tended mostly to involve a wider definition 
of Commonwealth power does not signify a centralist High 
Court so much as the nature of the policy matters involved
and the changing social, economic and technological 
context in which they had to be managed.
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The Australian experience of increasing national power 
is not unique, though it has gone further than in many 
other federations. Most developed nations now face 
the challenge of highly mobile populations and capital 
requiring the national government to collect most 
revenue. Most also have economies that are not only more 
nationally integrated but also have substantial interaction 
internationally requiring national governments to take 
more responsibility for economic regulation, transport and 
communications. Modern communications technology and 
population mobility are also widening people’s contacts 
and associations, weakening some local cleavages and 
strengthening national and international orientations. 
All these forces have been increasing the role of national 
governments, but not necessarily removing responsibilities 
from sub-national governments: a common trend is an 
increase in shared responsibilities with the challenge of 
managing such responsibilities well and ensuring proper 
accountability.
Former conservative Prime Minister John Howard referred 
to his experience as an Australian politician with his fingers 
on the public pulse, including through his regular talk-back 
radio appearances, of voters today identifying far more 
with being Australian than belonging to a particular State 
or region, and of expecting the national government to 
address their concerns. [1, p.101]
Nevertheless, there is a real danger of the national 
government taking undue advantage of its revenue-raising 
capacity to meddle in matters that are not the business of 
those beyond each State. Also, of course, States may well 
meddle excessively in matters better managed by more 
local communities.
Federation review
The Government embarked on a Review of the Federation 
in 2014 working closely with the States in the process. 
The Review did not get off to a good start however with 
the Commission of Audit pressing for each jurisdiction to 
be ‘sovereign in its own sphere of responsibility’, the 2014 
Budget unilaterally withdrawing promised funds to the 
States for hospitals and education, and the Review terms 
of reference repeating the simplistic line about ‘sovereignty 
in its own sphere’. [2] Fortunately, the discussion papers 
produced by Commonwealth officials convey more of the 
nuances of the issues and challenges Australia actually faces. 
(See in particular Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
2014b.) [3] They offer options not only for a significant shift 
of responsibilities back to the States but also some serious 
options that would shift some responsibilities further to the 
Commonwealth. Most importantly, they give a great deal of 
attention to the challenge of better managing the growing 
range of shared responsibilities. They also include a more 
considered assessment of the oft-quoted concern about VFI 
– the sharp differences between revenues and expenditures 
that necessitate large transfers from the Commonwealth to 
the States. In doing so, the papers clarify that increasing State 
expenditure responsibilities would exacerbate the problem 
and therefore require an even bigger shift to the States’ 
revenue raising responsibility if VFI were to be reduced.
Commonwealth political leaders are yet to respond seriously 
to the substance of the issues and options raised. Fortunately, 
there have been some signs of more leadership at the State 
level, particularly from New South Wales, assisted by some 
very capable State civil servants (some being refugees from 
the Commonwealth). [4]
Despite claims by the Commonwealth that tax reform must 
deliver lower, simpler and more efficient tax, the premiers 
take the view that we will almost certainly need more 
revenues to pay for the services the community wants, 
whether delivered by the States or the Commonwealth. 
There are always ways to deliver government services more 
efficiently and we do need to limit government expenditure 
to what the community and the economy can afford but, as 
we become an older society, and as we become wealthier 
and health becomes increasingly important to us, it is 
inevitable that we will want to spend more on health and 
related services and that this is likely to involve more public 
as well as more private spending.
Just as a shared approach to tax reform is needed, a 
shared approach to expenditure reform is needed, and the 
outcome is unlikely to involve a total split of responsibilities 
establishing ‘sovereignty’ over revenue collections or 
expenditure policies. This is not to suggest no room 
for reform, but to suggest greater priority be given to 
improving how we manage shared responsibilities and 
focus more on achieving better health and education and 
housing outcomes, and a more efficient economy, rather 
than wasting effort on trying to re-establish a federation 
suited to 1901.
Health reform
Health is perhaps the policy area most adversely affected by 
current federal arrangements, despite the fact that on most 
measures our health system performs well, particularly in 
terms of life expectancy and years of healthy living.
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Long history of Commonwealth involvement
Commonwealth involvement in health goes back to 
federation with the Constitution specifying that power 
relating to quarantine was concurrently enjoyed by the 
Commonwealth. It was based on this power that the 
Commonwealth first established a Department of Health in 
1921 following strong encouragement by the Rockefeller 
Foundation concerned about the influenza pandemic after 
the First World War. Communicable disease was identified 
as a major concern that could not be managed by the 
States on their own, but nor could it be managed by the 
Commonwealth without involving health service providers 
across the country. By that time, the Commonwealth 
was also extensively involved in health care through the 
Constitution’s defence power, providing support for war 
veterans and their dependants under the repatriation 
system.
Until after the Second World War, the Commonwealth 
focused on public health and health and medical research 
(and war veterans) but, in line with the war-time compact 
to expand social services after the privations of the war 
(developed largely by a Parliamentary Committee), interest 
turned to developing a national health insurance system 
complementing the national social security system that 
began with the introduction of age pensions in 1909. [5-7, 
8] The 1946 Constitutional change gave the Commonwealth 
new powers including to provide ‘medical and dental services 
(but not so as to authorise any form of civil conscription)’ 
and ‘pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits’.
The Chifley Government then enacted the National Health 
Service Act but it was never fully implemented. Instead, the 
Menzies Government implemented what became known as 
the Page Plan through regulations under Chifley’s legislation 
involving the first Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and a 
Pensioners Medical Service (which included grants to the 
States for hospital care), and then hospital benefits and a 
Medical Benefits Scheme both based on voluntary private 
health insurance.
Under Menzies, the Commonwealth also entered the field 
of residential aged care, funding charitable organisations 
to provide nursing home and hostel care for eligible older 
Australians. And it operated large repatriation hospitals in 
every State.
By the time of the Whitlam Government, the Commonwealth 
was already dominant in the areas of non-hospital aged 
care, medical benefits and pharmaceutical benefits, and was
involved with hospitals through funding to the States, 
hospital benefits for privately insured Australians and 
the direct operation of repatriation hospitals. Despite the 
public controversies surrounding the original Medibank 
proposals, Medibank did not represent a massive extension 
of Commonwealth involvement; it did, however, radically 
shift the health insurance system from subsidised voluntary 
private insurance to a universal public insurance approach. 
Whitlam kept an insurance model, despite some Labor 
colleagues pressing for a British-style National Health 
Service, and he chose not to take over responsibility for 
hospitals but to greatly increase grants to the States on 
condition that hospital services for all public patients would 
be free.
Debates about universal health insurance continued 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s and into the 1990s, through 
a series of Medibank schemes under the Fraser Government 
that wound back universal insurance, the resurrection of the 
original scheme by the Hawke Government under the name 
‘Medicare’, and promises by the conservative Opposition 
to abolish Medicare and to rely again on private health 
insurance. In 1996, however, John Howard promised to 
‘maintain Medicare in its entirety’ and the scheme has had 
considerable bipartisan support ever since.
Indeed, for the most part the Howard Government initiatives 
built on the Hawke/Keating developments including in 
particular the strengthening of primary healthcare, moving 
away from just paying medical benefits to re-shaping 
general practice encouraging computerisation, bigger 
practices, incentives for better treatment of the chronically 
ill and improved immunisation and other screening. Bulk-
billing in fact increased, services for Indigenous Australians 
continued to be extended and services in rural and remote 
areas improved. The Commonwealth also greatly extended 
its support of aged care beyond residential care, encouraging 
‘ageing in place’, and establishing stronger quality controls.
The Commonwealth became more interested in health 
outcomes and the effectiveness of the health services it 
was funding, not just in health financing and insurance. Its 
agreements with the States on hospital funding began to 
identify performance and to promote increased efficiency 
and, working with the States, it began to take a direct 
interest in quality and safety. By then, the Commonwealth 
had withdrawn from directly managing its repatriation 
hospitals but had developed sophisticated approaches to 
purchasing hospital services for veterans from both State 
and private hospital providers.
I mention this long history in part to demonstrate the 
degree of bipartisanship involved in the increasing role of 
the Commonwealth in health, notwithstanding periods 
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of bitter debate about the best approach to health 
insurance, but also to highlight the scale of Commonwealth 
involvement and the lack of any sense of public opposition 
to the Commonwealth widening its interest in healthcare 
services. While he may not have handled the situation well, 
Kevin Rudd gained considerable public support in 2007 
for his suggestion (or threat) that the Commonwealth take 
full financial responsibility for public hospital services. To 
the extent there was concern about the Commonwealth 
involvement, it was about unnecessary bureaucratic 
processes, too many small programs each with its own rules, 
and the lack of a clear overall strategy.
Blurred accountabilities, however, remain a major problem 
as our history of piecemeal developments has left the 
Australian system with a very confusing division of 
responsibilities and funding arrangements that has resulted 
in the so-called ‘blame game’. But there is no evidence of 
public support for transferring responsibilities away from 
the Commonwealth to the States.
So what are the practical problems with current 
arrangements, and where might future reform take us?
Changing demand on the health system
In many respects our biggest challenges are the flipside of 
our successes. Life expectancy has increased steadily at a 
remarkable pace – around one extra year of life every four 
years. Most of the increase is in years of healthy living, with 
the average period of incapacity declining as a proportion 
of our lives. Whereas the increase in life expectancy over 
most of the last century was the result of reductions in 
mortality amongst children and then amongst those up to 
middle age – meaning many more people reached age 50 
or more – the increase in life expectancy since about 1970 
has been driven more by reductions in mortality at older 
ages – meaning people having reached age 50 live longer. 
This trend is continuing. Since 1970, mortality rates amongst 
those aged 50 to 64 and amongst those aged 65 to 79 have 
steadily fallen. We all have to die sometime so the rates for 
those over 80 have increased, but now the rates for those 
aged 80 to 84 are actually falling. Projections suggest rates 
for those aged 80 to 89 may soon start to decline, with only 
rates for over 90s increasing.
Figure 1: Changes in Mortality Rates 1907 to 2013, Australia
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2016a [9]
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The downside of this remarkable success is that we have 
many more frail old people now and more with chronic 
illnesses such as heart disease, cancer and diabetes even 
while average years of healthy living are increasing at 
least as fast as life expectancy. Modern technology also 
means large numbers of people with chronic conditions 
are able to live comfortably and even independently, fully 
participating in society. But they, and those with more 
debilitating conditions, most often rely on a mix of services 
and medicines. So demand on our health system has 
shifted dramatically from people requiring episodic care 
via occasional visits to the GP or to a hospital or finally to 
support in an aged care home, to the chronically ill and 
frail aged needing a mix of support from GPs, specialists, 
hospital visits for surgery, physiotherapy, psychology, 
dialysis and so on. The Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare estimates the chronically ill now represent about 80 
per cent of the burden of disease. [10, p.54] Not all of the 
shift is age-related, with increasing concern about obesity 
in particular raising the risks of chronic illness at young as 
well as older ages. The yawning gap between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous health demonstrates that there remain 
serious failures to address, but evidence suggests that these 
too require a holistic approach to health service delivery 
rather than reliance on separate service providers.
This demand shift that has been underway for over thirty 
years now has exacerbated the boundary problems that 
have long existed in our health system, problems that were 
already more serious in Australia because of the unique 
division of responsibilities between the Commonwealth and 
the States, and between public and private health insurance
arrangements.
The challenge is to shift the architecture of the system away 
from an emphasis on the different types of providers and 
products – GPs, specialists, pharmaceuticals, hospitals, aged
care facilities – to a focus on patients according to their 
particular health needs.
Measures being taken
Considerable effort has been made to move in this direction 
over the last twenty five years. The gradual strengthening of 
general practice and encouragement of better management 
of chronically ill patients has begun to widen the healthcare 
services available, improve coordination and promote more 
continuity of care. The developing role of regional primary 
health organisations, despite some unfortunate politicking 
and unnecessary disruptions, has the potential to facilitate 
better links between hospitals and primary healthcare and 
to lead to useful initiatives such as better out-of-hours 
GP services and other measures to reduce pressure on 
emergency rooms. This seems to have been most successful 
where partnerships have been forged between the 
organisations and the regional hospital networks managed 
by the States.
The increasing role of aged care packages is also ensuring 
a more careful approach to responding to healthcare 
needs, offering services appropriate to individual needs 
and allowing more choice about where people may live. 
The packages also have the potential to reduce demand on 
hospitals.
There have been major investments into information 
systems and there are signs of improving information 
exchange between GPs, specialists and hospitals. The goal 
of a single electronic health record is still a long way off, but 
we should not ignore the improvements that have been 
made.
Further steps are on the agenda, amongst them the MBS 
Review Taskforce which is examining the list of medical 
services on the MBS and the Primary Health Care Advisory 
Group which recently identified further opportunities to 
reform primary healthcare focusing on the management 
of people with complex and chronic disease. [11,12] A 
tantalising possibility identified by the Advisory Group 
is to shift further from reliance on fee-for-service (which 
encourages more services) to other forms of funding for the 
chronically ill to promote continuity and coordination of 
care and better health outcomes. [12, p.9]
Some direct attempts have also been made to address 
boundary problems but so far with limited success. In the 
late 1990s Coordinated Care Trials were conducted with the
Commonwealth and the States pooling funds for identified 
patient groups and allocating these to a care coordinator to 
purchase the health services for the group. The evaluation 
suggested the quality of care generally improved with the 
likelihood of better health outcomes in time, but that the 
funding arrangements trialled were problematic, total 
costs generally increasing without satisfactory controls. 
[13] The Commonwealth-State healthcare agreements at 
that time also included an option to ‘measure and share’ 
aimed at addressing some specific boundary issues such as 
the provision of prescription drugs on hospital discharge 
and the management of outpatient services with a view 
to sharing the risks and the benefits of a more cooperative 
approach. Unfortunately little progress was made at that 
time.
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More recent developments and options
In 2004 John Howard asked me to conduct a review into the 
delivery of health and aged care services. I reported in 2005 
(the report has never been made public) recommending a 
package of incremental reforms, most of which he and his 
health minister, Tony Abbott, accepted, including to widen 
Commonwealth involvement in aged care, invest further 
in primary healthcare and invest further in information 
technology; I also recommended strengthening regional 
health service planning and coordination but that idea was 
not pursued at the time. In the longer term, I suggested, 
the Commonwealth should consider taking full financial 
responsibility for the health and aged care system based 
on a regional framework, advising that this was indeed 
viable but also noting the scale and risks involved in such 
a reform The Prime Minister and Health Minister agreed 
that in principle the Commonwealth having full financial 
responsibility made considerable sense, but in view of 
the risks involved in any transition they decided to focus 
attention on the incremental measures I had recommended. 
These, I had emphasised, were designed in part to make it 
easier sometime in the future to consider again this more 
radical structural reform.
When he came into power in 2007, Kevin Rudd flirted, as 
mentioned, with the idea of a full financial takeover but 
he ended up pursuing a less radical (but by no means 
modest) set of reforms. He established the National 
Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, (NHHRC) which 
recommended in 2009 substantial structural changes. [14] 
These included the Commonwealth taking full financial 
responsibility for primary healthcare, Indigenous health 
and aged care, sharing directly the risks associated with 
hospital financing to reduce any incentives to cost shift, 
and establishing a firmer regional planning framework 
building on the Divisions of GPs; but the report fell short 
of recommending a full Commonwealth financial takeover. 
The report also identified an even more radical option for 
more careful study, that would allow individuals to select 
their own insurer or healthcare manager to manage their 
Medicare health service entitlements in exchange for 
receiving their assessed Medicare risk-related premium, a 
‘managed competition’ option they named ‘Medicare Select’. 
In this model, people would either charge their medical, 
pharmaceutical and hospital costs to Medicare as most 
do now, or to their chosen insurer or healthcare manager 
which the Government would pay via an assessed Medicare-
equivalent premium (and which might charge an additional
premium for additional coverage). The payment of Medicare 
premiums to funds would replace the PHI rebate and the 
Medicare surcharge exemption for PHI members.
Rudd did not pursue Medicare Select but he did propose 
going somewhat further than the NHHRC Report’s main 
recommendations, in particular increasing Commonwealth 
financial involvement in hospital financing in exchange 
for a share of GST revenue as well as widening the 
Commonwealth’s role in primary health and aged care. This 
was clearly a bridge too far at the time and the subsequent 
Gillard Government negotiated a deal that confined 
itself to some but not all of the Bennett Report measures. 
Gillard retained the proposed regional primary healthcare 
organisations (unfortunately named ‘Medicare Locals’ by 
Rudd), relying on these to work with State regional hospital 
networks and new regional aged care arrangements to 
soften boundaries between primary and acute care and 
between aged care and hospitals. This complemented the 
most expensive measure in the deal, the Commonwealth 
agreeing to share directly the risks associated with hospital 
services by replacing block grants to the States with 
payments directly to hospital networks for a fixed share of 
the ‘efficient price’, whatever the level of demand.
The Abbott Government’s approach was confusing. 
While promising not to cut health spending, Abbott had 
foreshadowed concerns about both spending levels and 
the role played by the Medicare Locals, the latter reflecting 
criticism by some GPs that their role in primary healthcare 
was being undermined. There was some basis to this 
criticism and the very name, ‘Medicare Locals’, suggested 
they would deliver services directly rather than focus on 
planning and commissioning existing providers to fill gaps. 
The Government abolished the organisations and replaced 
them with so-called Primary Health Networks; hopefully, 
these will be able to draw on the often positive experience 
and expertise of those involved in the former Medicare 
Locals (and the GP Divisions before that), and not have to 
reinvent the wheel entirely.
Of more concern was the Commission of Audit Report 
which not only suggested establishing a clearer division of 
responsibilities between the Commonwealth and the States 
with each jurisdiction having sovereignty over its own area 
of responsibility, but that the Commonwealth consider 
limiting its involvement in hospital funding. [2, p.103] These 
ideas seemed to gain some official support when in the 2014 
Budget the Commonwealth announced unilaterally that 
it was not proceeding with the risk-sharing arrangement 
agreed previously with the States but returning to a form 
Federalism and Australia’s National Health and Health Insurance System
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of block grants indexed to prices. The terms of reference for 
the Review of the Federation released later included similar 
language, seemingly hinting that there might be a further 
shift of responsibilities to the States and a firm separation of 
responsibilities within the health system. [15]
Next steps
Fortunately, the bureaucrats responsible for preparing 
discussion papers for the Review were able to convince 
their political masters to allow other approaches to be 
canvassed, ones that start by addressing the issues from 
the perspective of more effective and efficient health 
services and improved health outcomes. Of the five options 
identified in the paper prepared for the June 2015 Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) Retreat, only one involved 
a significant transfer of responsibility to the States (via full 
responsibility for public hospitals). [3] Two options involve 
more sharing of responsibilities (for care packages for the
chronically ill and for regional purchasing agencies) 
and two involve transferring more responsibility to the 
Commonwealth (via a new hospital benefit and via a health 
purchasing agency).
There was no sign of support amongst Premiers for the 
first option, but comments by South Australian Premier 
Weatherill suggested there may well be support for the 
option of a Commonwealth hospital benefit. This could 
build on the Rudd/Gillard initiative for the Commonwealth 
to share the risk of growth in hospital episodes, at least 
to some proportion of the efficient price. This is already 
promoting greater efficiency in public hospitals and, if taken 
further, could also promote greater cost effectiveness in the 
health system as a whole. It could for example make it easier 
to introduce the option of shared funding of care packages 
for the chronically ill, managing this at the regional level 
between the States’ local hospital networks and the Primary 
Health Networks, and reducing the current emphasis on 
fee-for-service for GPs through whole-of-care funding for 
registered chronically ill patients.
In other words, future reform that would actually improve the 
health system is most likely to involve more Commonwealth 
financial involvement, not less, and probably more shared
responsibilities not fewer. The danger, however, is that this 
will continue or increase the blurring of accountability and 
mean the blame game will continue.
An approach that would limit this risk is to clarify respective 
roles within areas of shared responsibility, and to reform 
the way in which national policies are established when 
responsibility is shared. In particular, the Commonwealth 
might continue to increase its share of financial 
responsibility playing the role of the national health insurer, 
while the States might increase their role in service delivery. 
To promote greater integration of services on the ground 
and more patient-oriented care, States need to continue 
to strengthen local and regional capacity for planning and 
coordination (working with the regional Primary Health 
Networks) and for local delivery (in the case of public 
hospitals). This transformation has been underway for some 
time now, and may take more time to complete, but it would 
be unfortunate if we were to reverse the process. It has been 
contributing to improvements in the health system and, if 
well handled, could also contribute to improvements in the 
federation and in expenditure control.
Reforming the way national policies are established when 
responsibility is shared, means giving the States a genuine 
place at the table. It also means constraining the capacity 
of the Commonwealth to impose additional rules and 
processes that may limit local flexibility and innovation. 
Recent experience, not just under the current government, 
has been in sharp contrast with such an approach. Hopefully 
the atmosphere of cooperation that seemed to surround 
the COAG retreat in June 2015, combined with the change 
in the leadership of the Commonwealth Government, is the 
beginning of a more cooperative style.
Private health insurance and Medicare
The role of private health insurance (PHI) in our national 
health and health insurance system may also have 
significant implications for federal relationships. Regulation 
and support for has been a Commonwealth responsibility 
since the early 1950s under the Page Plan.
Australia’s approach to PHI is unique, and uniquely confused. 
While Medicare provides universal health insurance cover 
(unlike the United States), nearly half the population retains
PHI and is encouraged to do so by government (unlike 
the United Kingdom or Canada). PHI covers members for 
hospital services they might otherwise use as public patients 
funded by Medicare, and also offers choice of physician, 
greater amenity and the ability to reduce waiting times for 
various ‘elective’ procedures and diagnoses. The confusion 
caused by the system is best demonstrated by that uniquely 
Australian question people face in emergency departments: 
‘do you want to go public or go private?’ The right answer for 
those with PHI is rarely obvious, confirming the policy’s lack 
of coherence.
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Government policy tends to focus simply on the level of PHI 
membership; it rarely focuses on the more important issues 
of efficiency and effectiveness of the insurance and the 
services covered, and the ease for consumers to decide on 
their cover and how to use it.
There are two main options for making our approach 
coherent and user friendly. The first is to remove any 
government support for PHI and to allow it to play a residual 
role to the universal health insurer, Medicare, where people 
may choose to opt out at their own expense. The second 
is the Medicare Select approach where Medicare can be 
managed by PHI funds (or other health management 
organisations), people being able to choose to direct their 
Medicare risk-rated premium to their preferred fund. The 
funds could charge extra to cover more services or particular 
service providers, but must cover at least those otherwise 
met by Medicare. This article does not canvass the relative 
merits of these two options, but notes that either would 
make more sense than current arrangements. Several other 
observations are relevant to federal responsibilities and to 
possible policy directions for the two major parties. The first 
is that the second approach could only be implemented 
if the Commonwealth had full financial responsibility for 
Medicare and could appropriate the money for the risk-rated
premium vouchers to be passed on to the nominated PHI 
funds. Proponents of a greater role for PHI need to appreciate 
that that almost certainly implies a greater role for the 
Commonwealth in funding the national health insurance 
system. The Medicare Select approach is mentioned in the 
COAG discussion paper but is not included in the list of 
options for reform at this time because of its complexity, but 
it remains a serious model for future consideration.
The second point is the lack of a coherent approach by 
either side of politics at the moment. Labor’s ‘Mediscare’ 
campaign in the 2016 federal election accusing the Turnbull 
Government of planning to privatise Medicare does them 
no credit. Medicare is an insurance scheme not a national 
health system like the United Kingdom’s; health services are 
delivered by both the private and the public sector and, to 
some extent, Medicare’s health insurance has been delivered 
in part by the private sector as well. Parts of the payment 
system such as its IT support have long been outsourced. 
Moreover, Labor continues to support subsidies for PHI 
via both the PHI rebate and the Medicare levy surcharge 
exemption. Its means testing of the PHI rebate was also a 
sleight of hand; high income earners with PHI paid more tax 
through the loss of the rebate and those without PHI paid 
more tax through the increased levy surcharge, so that the 
measure was just a messy tax increase that in fact increased 
subsidies for PHI and reduced transparency.
The Coalition’s apparently unconditional support of PHI, on 
the other hand, allows critics to doubt its commitment to 
Medicare. Labor’s ‘Mediscare’ campaign gained traction for 
this reason, and because of the measures pursued in Abbott’s 
2014 budget. Complaints about Labor’s tactics might have 
more credibility if the Turnbull Government articulated the 
Medicare principles it is committed to, and moved to clarify 
the role it sees for the private sector consistent with those 
principles.
The Canadians have demonstrated the value of articulating 
the principles behind Medicare. Our principles may differ a 
little from Canada’s and we may not need to follow Canada’s
practice of putting them into legislation. We should however 
look to explore our system’s principles through COAG in 
order to gain a shared Commonwealth and State view, and 
to debate them in the Parliament. The key principles in my 
view are:
1. Universal coverage: that all Australians should have  
 access to health services according to their health needs;
2.  Equitable financing: that the health system should be  
 funded according to people’s capacity to pay;
3.  Efficiency and effectiveness: that government support  
 for the system should be based on cost effectiveness in  
 terms of health outcomes; and
4.  Consumer and provider satisfaction: that the system  
 should be oriented to patients and consumers, providing  
 safe, high quality and convenient healthcare, while also
 respecting the professionalism of those providing the  
 services.
The Turnbull Government initiated consultations on PHI late 
last year led by Graeme Samuel. [16] We are yet to see the 
results, but Samuel’s background suggested the possibility 
of reforms to increase competitiveness in our PHI system 
and in the delivery of health services. Subsequently, the 
Minister announced a new advisory committee chaired 
by Jeff Harmer, a former departmental secretary, with 
representatives of a range of interest groups; the prospects 
for reform may therefore be more limited now. [11] With 
serious reform, current subsidies could be redesigned 
to more properly reflect the costs PHI funds meet that 
genuinely replace those otherwise met by Medicare, and 
to ensure they and the related regulatory arrangements 
better promote efficiency and contain PHI premiums and 
copayments. In time, such reforms could facilitate renewed 
consideration of Medicare Select.
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Expenditure control
Another critical issue is the growing total cost of Australia’s 
health system and the risk that we are not achieving 
value for money. How can we improve efficiency and cost 
effectiveness, and are there implications here also for the 
most appropriate federal arrangement?
Health insurance, like any insurance arrangement, presents 
the risk of ‘moral hazard’: the fact that a third party – the 
insurer – must pay for a service provides an incentive for 
both the insured person and the service provider to press 
the envelope and oversupply. This may involve increasing 
the price, adding extras to the service, exaggerating the 
event that gave rise to the insurance claim and so on. 
Insurers try to contain the problem by imposing copayments 
or by limiting eligible service providers or by having their 
own inspectors assess the damage or by requiring service 
providers to compete; they also look to reward behaviour 
which reduces risks. Moral hazard is much harder to handle 
in the case of health insurance.
While there are no doubt cases of conscious exploitation, 
more commonly the problem arises because doctors really 
do want the very best for their patients and they view any 
attempt by the insurer to constrain the service as placing 
in jeopardy the doctor-patient relationship. It is also clear 
that information asymmetry (the reliance of patients on 
their doctors’ advice) and the limited level of competition 
amongst doctors allows some doctors to charge substantial
fees reducing the value of the insurance product.
Health economists emphasise the importance of supply side 
measures in controlling expenditure and addressing value 
for money, and not just demand side measures (health 
economists also emphasise investment in preventative 
measure to reduce demand and not just co-payments). 
Allocative inefficiency has also long been a concern and the 
increasing level of chronic illness increases this risk as too 
much may be spent on hospitalisations and not enough on 
GPs and allied health support, or on preventive measures 
and early detection of illness.
Let me touch on each of these aspects of cost control 
and achieving best value for money. First, the issue of co-
payments as a form of demand-side control. The Commission 
of Audit and the 2014 Budget proposal to introduce a GP co-
payment was widely criticised for being unfair. In my view, 
the proposal was deeply flawed not because it was unfair 
but because it was unlikely to have much effect on efficiency, 
and because it failed to address the need to develop a 
more coherent system-wide approach to co-payments 
and safety nets that might constrain over-servicing while 
guaranteeing maximum total out-of-pocket expenses and 
preserving good access to cost-effective primary healthcare. 
We have an extensive system of co-payments and safety 
nets applying to prescription drugs, a haphazard system of 
copayments for GP and specialist visits and no co-payments 
for public patients in hospitals. Achieving a coherent system 
that is not based on each service but on each patient’s total 
Medicare services and expenses will remain hard while we 
have separate funding arrangements.
Second, the issue of supply-side measures. Australia was a 
pioneer in introducing cost effectiveness rules for listing and 
pricing pharmaceuticals on the PBS. As the Grattan Institute 
has observed, however, we could apply the rules more 
firmly, in particular making more use of generic drugs and 
using their prices as benchmarks for relevant new products.
[17] Australia also broke new ground when it imposed 
similar cost-effectiveness rules to new MBS services. The 
current MBS Review Task Force is rightly now examining all 
the existing services on the schedule to see whether they are 
justified and whether the price reflects their effectiveness. 
The Grattan Institute has also identified several cases where 
evidence reveals that the medical service subsidised by 
Medicare is not only not cost-effective, but is not effective 
at all and is possibly unsafe. [18] As with the PBS process, 
this review needs – and has – firm clinical leadership but 
also economic input. As mentioned earlier, the Primary 
Health Care Advisory Group also advocated reducing the 
MBS reliance on fee-for-service (which tends to encourage 
over-servicing).
The process of identifying ‘efficient prices’ for public hospital 
episodes is already driving efficiency gains, building on 
those from the earlier introduction of case-mix financing. 
The 2014 Budget measure to return to Commonwealth 
block-funding for State public hospitals may have reduced 
the Commonwealth’s Forward Estimates but only by shifting 
the costs to the States. In jeopardising the development 
of efficient pricing across our public hospitals it could also 
undermine moves to improve efficiency (and cost savings) 
in the system as a whole.
These three within-program supply-side strategies – cost 
effectiveness processes under the MBS and PBS, possible 
moves away from fee-for-service under the MBS, and the 
application of efficient prices to hospital services - have the 
potential to achieve far greater efficiency gains – and cost 
savings – than the crude GP co-payment proposal.
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Thirdly, however, we need to do more to address allocative 
efficiency, not just efficiency within each of our major 
programs. A surprising weakness in our national health 
insurance system has been the failure to act as an insurer 
– to link existing data across the system and to analyse it 
to identify financial and health risks, and to identify the 
additional data we need to identify both health needs and 
health outcomes, and to track people over time. Such data
would not only help the managers of our insurance system 
but also provide valuable feedback to clinicians and data 
for researchers. Some progress is now being made but 
we have a long way to go. The emerging regional health 
system arrangements also offer the potential to support 
better allocation of resources. The Primary Health Networks 
may have small budgets, but they have the flexibility to 
ensure they are used to fill gaps and to improve important 
connections that could reduce hospitalisations and ensure 
more cost-effective care. Linking data could also allow 
each region to identify the costs of healthcare services to 
its population, allowing comparisons to be made against 
benchmark costs given the known health risks, and against 
clinically ideal patterns of service utilisation. This could 
guide not only the regional primary health and hospital 
networks but also officials at the State and Commonwealth 
level in considering allocations of funds between regions.
Returning to my overall theme of the health system’s 
federal arrangements, there is little evidence to suggest 
that returning more responsibility to the States would 
promote greater efficiency. There is a strong case for a more 
integrated approach and continuing to move towards the 
Commonwealth being the national insurer, so long as the 
Commonwealth does more to act as an insurer and to pursue 
supply-side cost effectiveness measures and establish a 
more coherent system of demand-side controls. There is also 
a strong case for regional flexibility and capacity to influence 
the allocation of funds.
conclusion
Australia’s approach to federalism has been described 
as ‘pragmatic’. [19] While that is not entirely a positive 
description, encompassing as it does occasional ‘opportunist’ 
political game-playing, it is preferable to ideologically or 
theoretically driven approaches. The reform process that 
began in 2014 could be given a more positive, pragmatic 
flavour, focusing on tangible improvements in public 
services and increased efficiency, rather than ideological 
considerations. There were signs last year of a greater focus 
on particular areas of public services – health, education 
and housing – and on how changes in federal arrangements 
might improve their effectiveness and efficiency.
While health reform in Australia has been marked by 
piecemeal, incremental changes, the overall trend to 
increasing Commonwealth involvement I would argue has 
not been accidental or driven by power-hungry centralists: 
it has been shaped by broader national and international 
developments including technological change and the 
maturing of our nation and its place internationally, and by 
a widespread desire for a national universal health insurance 
system.
In many respects the Australian health system performs well, 
but the emerging challenges demand a more integrated, 
patient-oriented system. This is likely to require a further 
shift towards the Commonwealth in terms of financial 
responsibility, as the national insurer. But it also requires 
close cooperation with the States, who could play a firmer 
role in service delivery and in supporting regional planning 
and coordination. A clearer distinction between roles (for 
example, funder versus provider), seems a more sensible 
basis for reform discussion than an attempt to fully separate 
responsibilities within the health system.
The likelihood of sharing overall responsibility for the health 
system also suggests there is a need to involve the States 
more fully in processes for setting national policies. A good 
start to this might be made if the Turnbull Government 
suggested to COAG some core Medicare principles that 
might guide future reforms and avoid the misleading 
political rhetoric that undermined constructive debate in 
the 2016 election.
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